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Abstract:   
The article offers an ‘insider story’ of the establishment of the Office of Legal Affairs in the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947) in 1982/83 and of its increasing involvement in 
assisting GATT dispute settlement panels and the Uruguay Round negotiations on a new World Trade 
Organization with compulsory jurisdiction for the settlement of trade disputes (Sections I and II). The 
transformation, within only one decade, of the anti-legal pragmatism in GATT 1947 into the 
compulsory WTO dispute settlement system amounted to a ‘revolution’ in international law. But the 
‘public reason’ governing the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system remains limited, notably by (1) 
the domination of GATT/WTO decision-making by governments interested in limiting their own 
legal, democratic and judicial accountability vis-à-vis citizens for their often welfare-reducing trade 
restrictions and distortions; (2) the deliberate neglect for the customary law requirements of 
interpreting treaties and settling related disputes ‘in conformity with principles of justice and 
international law’, including ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’; (3) the treatment of 
citizens as mere objects of GATT/WTO law and institutions rather than as ‘democratic principals’ of 
all governance institutions, ‘agents of justice’ and main economic actors; and (4) the deliberate neglect 
for the GATT/WTO legal obligations of ‘consistent interpretation’, ‘judicial comity’ and ‘access to 
justice’ in domestic courts in the ‘dispute settlement system of the WTO’ (Sections III and IV).  
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THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GATT OFFICE OF LEGAL AFFAIRS AND THE LIMITS OF ‘PUBLIC 
REASON’ IN THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann
*
 
Introduction: From ‘Rule by Law’ to ‘Rule of Law’ in the World Trading System? 
Since constitutional republicanism in ancient Greece, legal systems continue to evolve in response to 
‘struggles for justice’ and civil society claims that law and governance must be justifiable in terms of 
justice and individual rights, including rights of producers, investors, traders and consumers engaging 
in mutually beneficial economic cooperation. The spread of republicanism (e.g. from Greece to Italy 
and to the ‘Hanseatic League’ in Northern Europe) promoted transnational commercial law throughout 
Europe based on freedom of contract, private property rights, convertibility of currencies, 
transnational banking and commercial arbitration. The lex mercatoria was not only a private law 
merchant; it remained embedded into national and transnational regulation and trade agreements that 
evolved into a multilevel legal system since the European system of bilateral trade agreements 
following the Cobden-Chevallier trade agreement (1860) between England and France.
1
 The 
transformation of free trade areas and customs unions into cosmopolitan constitutional systems – first 
among German states during the 19th century (e.g. the German Zollverein 1834-1919) and, since the 
1950s, among the today 31 member states of the European Economic Area (EEA) – illustrated the 
potential significance of transnational economic cooperation for constructing ‘cosmopolitan peace’ 
through ‘cosmopolitan constitutional law’, as predicted in I. Kant’s blueprint for ‘Perpetual Peace 
(1795). It is from this ‘constitutional perspective’ that - having served as first ‘legal officer’ hired by 
the Secretariat of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947) in 1981 and as legal 
secretary of the Uruguay Round Negotiating Group elaborating the ‘Dispute Settlement 
Understanding’ (DSU) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) - this author interprets and evaluates 
the creation of an Office of Legal Affairs in 1982/83 inside the GATT Secretariat as a turning point for 
the emergence of a ‘rule of law’ system in worldwide trade relations aimed at strengthening the 
‘legalization’ of world trade (e.g. resulting from the 1979 Tokyo Round Agreements) so as to further 
‘depoliticize’ intergovernmental trade politics, reduce transaction costs and provide ‘security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading system’, as required by Article 3 of the DSU (cf. Sections I to 
II).  
Upon my arrival and first contacts inside the GATT Secretariat, many colleagues told me that – in 
their view – the Secretariat should never have an Office of Legal Affairs; lawyers should not 
participate in GATT dispute settlement proceedings, and – as repeatedly stated by the EU 
Commissioner for Trade Policy - GATT should never become a tribunal. When accepting the job offer 
from the GATT Secretariat (and declining a financially more attractive job offer from the World 
Bank’s Office of Legal Affairs with then more than 100 lawyers), I had hoped that my appointment as 
a ‘legal officer’ was a sign of the rediscovery by diplomats of the role of law in international trade, 
                                                     
* Emeritus Professor of International and European law and former head of the Law Department of the European University 
Institute, Florence. Former professor at the University of Geneva and its Graduate Institute of International Studies. 
Former legal adviser in the Germany Ministry of Economic Affairs (1978-1980), in the GATT Secretariat (1981-1990), 
legal consultant in GATT/WTO (1990-2012) and secretary, member or chairman of numerous GATT/WTO dispute 
settlement panels. The author wishes to thank Gabrielle Marceau for constructive criticism. This contribution was written 
for a special issue on the ‘GATT/WTO Legal Affairs Division at 30’ of the International Organizations Law Review 
2013. 
1 Cf. E.U.Petersmann, Principles of World Trade, in: R. Bernhardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 
Instalment No. 8 (1985), 530 – 539.  
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similar to my own discovery – during my studies of international law at the University of Geneva – 
that, in the words of the genius loci Jean-Jacques Rousseau, ‘it is to law alone, that men owe justice 
and liberty’ (Discourse on Political Economy, 1750). The fact that all GATT contracting parties had 
adopted national constitutions (written or unwritten) seemed to prove their ‘constitutional insight’ that 
people can constrain their rational egoism (cf. Thomas Hobbes: homo homini lupus est) only through 
self-commitment to constitutional rules and institutional ‘checks and balances’ (like independent 
courts of justice) transforming private interests into public interests by empowering citizens to act as 
‘agents of justice’ for the common good (like promotion of general consumer welfare through rules-
based competition and trade). Just as economic law had played a leading role in the long processes of 
constitutionalizing national societies, the postwar system of multilateral trade agreements establishing 
the European Communities (EC) offered obvious historical evidence of how the creative tensions 
between individualism, nationalism, international law and competition enable international trade law 
to induce international transformations (like compulsory jurisdiction for peaceful adjudication of 
disputes, the emergence of a new ‘international common law’ of multilevel trade governance) that 
elude policymakers in most other areas of international relations. Yet, the ‘public reason’ of social 
institutions remains shaped by the ‘private reason’, rational self-interests and unconscious instincts of 
its agents and ‘principals’, including the desires of many rulers to free their power politics of legal 
constraints and institutional ‘checks and balances’ (as illustrated by Dick the Butcher’s advice - in 
Shakespeare’s Henry the Sixth - to ‘kill all the lawyers’). The deliberate decision not to establish an 
Office of Legal Affairs prior to 1982/83 reflected 35 years of anti-legal ‘diplomatic management 
ideology’ prevailing among GATT diplomats (as described by Frieder Roessler in his contribution to 
this volume), which had been a response also to the non-ratification of GATT 1947 by national 
parliaments and to the only ‘provisional application’ of GATT rules subject to ‘existing legislation 
reservations’. As the rational self-interests of trade diplomats and rent-seeking interest groups - for 
instance in avoiding legal, democratic and judicial accountability for their often non-transparent and 
welfare-reducing trade protectionism redistributing domestic income for the benefit of powerful 
producer interests (e.g. cotton, textiles and agricultural producers in Europe and North-America) – 
continued to dominate many GATT policy and dispute settlement decisions during the 1980s, I 
decided to resume my academic career as of October 1989; at the request of Director-General A. 
Dunkel, I continued to service the Uruguay Round Negotiating Group elaborating the ‘Dispute 
Settlement Understanding’ (DSU) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as legal secretary only on 
the basis of a consultant contract. 
The ‘political miracle’ of the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations in April 1994 
entailed a ‘legal revolution’ in international relations, as illustrated by the fact that the DSU 
established – for the first time in human history – a worldwide, multilevel, compulsory dispute 
settlement jurisdiction (e.g. at the level of WTO panels, the WTO Appellate Body and WTO 
arbitration) and ‘dispute settlement system of the WTO’ (Article 3 DSU) providing also for individual 
‘access to justice’ inside domestic jurisdictions and to transnational commercial arbitration inside the 
WTO.
2
 Yet, my personal experiences as secretary in the Uruguay Round negotiations on the DSU, as 
secretary, member or chairman of numerous GATT/WTO dispute settlement panels, and as legal 
consultant advising less-developed countries in WTO dispute settlement proceedings (pursuant to 
Article 27 DSU) prompted me to increasingly criticize, already since the 1980s, two systemic failures 
of the GATT/WTO dispute settlement practices, as recalled in the concluding Sections III and IV: 
First, due to the self-interests and ‘legal ignorance’ of many trade diplomats (eg regarding the 
customary rules of treaty interpretation, state responsibility, and adjudication), most GATT dispute 
settlement panels during the 1980s continued to neglect the customary law requirement of interpreting 
the often indeterminate GATT rules and principles not only on the basis of their text, context, 
objective and purpose, but also ‘in conformity with the principles of justice and international law’, 
                                                     
2 Cf. E.U.Petersmann, The GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System. International Law, International Organizations and 
Dispute Settlement (London: Kluwer, 1997), chapter 5. 
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including ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’, as recalled in the 1969 Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (cf its Preamble and Article 31) as well as in numerous UN treaties (eg Article 
1 UN Charter). Discussions among GATT dispute settlement panelists and GATT Secretariat staff 
assisting them were often influenced by political rather than legal considerations, for instance  
 in the case of the three panel reports on EEC subsidies for wheat flour (1983), pasta (1983) and 
canned fruit (1985), which were never adopted in view of their unconvincing legal reasoning (eg 
that EEC subsidies for wheat flour had ‘caused undue disturbance to normal commercial 
interests’ of the USA in terms of GATT Article XVI:2 without resulting in the EEC ‘having 
more than an equitable share of world export trade in that product’ in terms of Article XVI:3 
GATT as interpreted by the 1979 Tokyo Round Agreement on Subsidies);
3
 
 in the case of the – likewise un-adopted - panel report on EEC citrus preferences (1985), where 
the panel clarified neither the ‘uncertain legal status’ of these preferential arrangements under 
Article XXIV GATT nor the legal basis for its ‘non-violation’ finding that the EEC had to 
compensate for the trade losses caused by ‘trade diversion’;4 or 
 when the GATT Secretariat division in charge of administrating the GATT Agreement on 
Antidumping refused to discuss whether the general international law rules on state 
responsibility justify a panel recommendation of reimbursing illegal antidumping duties, in 
conformity with the jurisprudence in many domestic legal and dispute settlement systems, and 
lawyers of the GATT Office of Legal Affairs were later excluded from GATT dispute settlement 
proceedings challenging antidumping measures
5
; 
 or if other requests for more effective legal remedies were rejected – without reference to the 
customary rules on state responsibility, for instance on the ground that ‘recommendations of this 
nature had not been within customary practice in dispute settlement under the GATT system’.6  
 The resignation of the chairperson of the ‘pasta panel’ on the ground that he had been exposed 
to undue pressures from a French diplomat, and jokes about the close relationship of the French 
Director of the GATT division on agriculture to his former colleagues inside the EEC 
Commission, illustrated the politicized atmosphere of GATT panel proceedings during the 1980s 
challenging the EEC’s agricultural policies. 
Following the regular participation of the Office of Legal Affairs in GATT panel proceedings since 
1984, the ‘anti-legal dispute settlement traditions’ of some operational GATT divisions gave rise to a 
few tensions, ushering in later decision by GATT Director-General Dunkel to exclude the Office of 
Legal Affairs from GATT dispute settlement proceedings involving antidumping and countervailing 
duty measures. As long as trade diplomats and their legal advocates in national Ministries insisted on 
power-oriented pursuit of ‘national interests’ in terms of ‘political realism’7 by exercising the WTO 
monitoring, rulemaking and dispute settlement functions without protecting justice for citizens - in 
blatant disregard for the customary rules on treaty interpretation, state responsibility and adjudication -
, the WTO objective of ‘providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system’ 
(Article 3 DSU) cannot be realized. The path-dependent, intergovernmental treatment of citizens in 
GATT/WTO politics as mere objects of GATT/WTO rules runs counter to the customary law 
requirements of interpreting treaties and settling related disputes ‘in conformity with principles of 
                                                     
3 For a critical discussion of these panel reports (SCM/42, 43, L/5778) see: R.Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law. The 
Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System (Butterworth 1993), at 147-157. 
4 Cf. GATT document L/5776 and Hudec (note 3), at 157 ff. 
5 Cf. Petersmann (note 2), at 79 f, 90 f, 224 ff. 
6 ‘Trondheim panel report’, GPR.DS2/R, at para. 4.17; cf Petersmann (note 2), at 230 ff. 
7 For an overview of five different conceptions of foreign policies (realist theories, neoliberal ‘regime theories’, 
functionalism, public choice theories, constitutional theories) and their impact on the design of international trade law 
and institutions see: Petersmann (note 2), at 10 ff, 14 ff. 
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justice’ and ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’, as codified in the VCLT as well as in 
the law of ever more international organizations committed to the human rights obligations of all 
states (cf Articles 2 and 3 Lisbon Treaty on European Union). Having lectured constitutional law 
before practicing international economic law (IEL) as a legal advisor in national and international 
institutions, my arguments – since the 1980s – in favor of citizen-oriented ‘constitutional 
interpretations’ of GATT rules and dispute settlement procedures from the perspective of reasonable 
citizens (‘methodological individualism’) - i.e. focusing on the normative task of clarifying, justifying 
and developing IEL ‘in conformity with principles of justice’ so as to reconcile conflicts among public 
and private interests through ‘public reason’ consistent with ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all’ – remain relevant to date, notwithstanding their rejection as ‘politically naïve’ by power-
oriented trade politicians and their ‘Westphalian advocates’ pointing to the disagreement on theories 
of IEL.
8
 Fortunately, civil society and human rights advocates continue challenging welfare-reducing 
abuses of trade policy discretion neglecting consumer welfare, human rights and other ‘principles of 
justice’ that are nowhere explicitly mentioned in GATT/WTO law.  
Second, as GATT/WTO law regulates the ‘dispute settlement system of the WTO’ (Article 3 DSU) in 
terms of multilevel legal obligations to protect equal freedoms, non-discriminatory competition and 
rule of law at international as well as domestic levels of trade regulation, it remains to be hoped that – 
as discussed in the concluding Section IV - future lawyers and courts of justice will take more 
seriously the ‘consistent interpretation’ and ‘judicial comity’ requirements of national and 
international legal systems (cf. Article 31 VCLT, Article XVI:4 WTO Agreement) requiring national, 
regional and WTO governance institutions and dispute settlement bodies to cooperate in their common 
task of ‘providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system’ (Article 3 DSU) in 
transnational trade transactions among citizens. The history of rights-based constitutionalism confirms 
the Kantian insight that humanity is capable of transforming power politics through 
‘constitutionalizing’ authoritarian ‘rule-by-law’ and institutionalizing ‘rule-of-law’ for the benefit of 
citizens not only inside, but also across nations. Hence, I have argued since the 1980s
9
 that national, 
regional and GATT dispute settlement bodies should follow the example of ‘multilevel judicial 
cooperation’ in European economic law, international investment, commercial and human rights law 
by interpreting and developing the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system for the benefit of citizens in 
order to provide ‘security and stability to the multilateral trading system’ (Article 3 DSU), as 
illustrated by the WTO Appellate Body interpretations of the WTO legal requirements of ‘fair price 
comparisons’ in antidumping ‘zeroing practices’ for the benefit of adversely affected traders rather 
than at the whim of trade bureaucracies.
10
 In the 21st century, multilevel governance of transnational 
public goods – like a rules-based world trading system protecting consumer welfare and rule of law, 
rather than the power of the rulers to tax citizens and redistribute domestic income through welfare-
reducing, discriminatory trade restrictions – must be justified and legally designed on the basis of 
‘cosmopolitan constitutionalism’ recognizing citizens as ultimate sources of value, bearers of 
constitutional rights and ‘democratic owners’ (‘principals’) of all governance institutions. The 
                                                     
8 On the lack of a coherent theory of IEL see already: E.U.Petersmann, International Economic Theory and International 
Economic Law - On the need for a legal theory of international economic order, in: R.Macdonald/Johnston (eds), The 
Structure and Process of International Law (London: Kluwer, 1983) 227 – 261. On justifying international legal 
guarantees of equal freedoms, non-discriminatory conditions of competition and transnational rule of law (e.g. in IMF 
and GATT law) by their ‘constitutional functions’ for protecting equal freedoms and human welfare of citizens as 
protected in national constitutions see: E.U.Petersmann, Constitutional Functions and Constitutional Problems of 
International Economic Law. International and Domestic Foreign Trade Law and Policy in the United States, the 
European Community and Switzerland (Fribourg: Fribourg University Press/Boulder Publishers, 1991). 
9
 Cf. E.U.Petersmann, Application of GATT by the Court of Justice of the European Communities, in: Common Market Law 
Review 20 (1983), 397 – 437. 
10
 On the, by now, almost 20 WTO dispute settlement proceedings challenging the ‘zeroing methodology’ in antidumping 
calculations see: S.Cho, Global Constitutional Lawmaking, in: University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 
31(2010), 621-678. 
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‘sustainable development’ and rule-of-law objectives of WTO law, like the limited powers of WTO 
institutions as ‘agents’ of citizens as their ‘democratic principals’, call for stronger constitutional 
restraints, judicial remedies and multilevel ‘accountability mechanisms’ limiting abuses of power by 
‘principles of justice’ and ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’, as prescribed by the 
customary rules of international treaty interpretation and related adjudication. 
I.  The Establishment of a GATT Office of Legal Affairs in 1982/1983: A Constitutional             
Lawyer’s Perspective 
In 1980, following the replacement of Olivier Long by Arthur Dunkel as Director-General of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), the GATT Secretariat published – for the first 
time in the history of GATT – a vacancy notice for employing an ‘assistant legal officer’. After having 
been selected among more than 200 candidates and having taken up my duties on 1 March 1981, my 
boss - Mr. Hielke von Tuinen, assistant GATT Director-General who had just accepted a newly 
created Secretariat position as Legal Advisor to the Director-General from 1981 until his retirement in 
1982 – told me that my selection had been due to my practice-oriented, legal education which fitted 
the pragmatic GATT legal practices:  
 The Selection Committee had noted my doctor degree in international law and my publications 
on international and European law, including also legal analyses of GATT, UNCTAD and other 
fields of IEL.  
 But more important had been my practical legal experiences in civil, commercial and 
administrative law courts, as assistant of two international judges from the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) and from the European Court of Human Rights, as legal advisor in the German 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and German representative in EC, OECD, UN and NATO 
institutions, which reflected ‘hands-on experiences’ in economic regulation that were essential 
for GATT’s ‘diplomats jurisprudence’ (R.Hudec). 
The two selection criteria – legal reasonableness and pragmatic handling of legal practices – remain at 
the center of the dialectic evolution of international and constitutional law systems aimed at 
reconciling utility-maximizing pursuit of rational self-interests (by the homo economicus) with the 
sociological evidence that voluntary rule-compliance by people depends on their acceptance of law as 
being justifiable by ‘principles of justice’ and ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’ (homo 
ordinans, zoon autokrator). Inside the GATT Secretariat, Prof. Jan Tumlir – director of GATT’s 
Research Division during the 1980s – was one of the few GATT officials who, in many of his 
publications, shared my convictions for the need for ‘constitutional economics analyses’ of trade 
policies and for stronger constitutional guarantees of non-discriminatory competition and protection of 
consumer welfare.11  As legal advisor in the German Ministry of Economic Affairs and representative 
of Germany in the EC, I had been able to observe how Germany’s ‘legal strategy’ of supporting 
requests by European citizens for ‘constitutional interpretations’ and judicial enforcement of the 
customs union rules of EC law – which the drafters of the EC Treaty had copied from the 
corresponding GATT obligations of all EC member states12 - had enhanced the social and democratic 
acceptance and decentralized application of European common market law as a cosmopolitan legal 
system based not only on rights and duties of governments, but also on rights of citizens and ‘public 
reasons’ which people could share and support. As all UN member states had accepted commitments 
to respect, protect and fulfill human rights demanded by their citizens and to interpret international 
treaties in conformity with their human rights obligations (cf. Article 31 VCLT), constitutional theory 
                                                     
11 Cf. J. Tumlir, Contribution of Economics to International Disorder (1981); idem, Economic Policy as a Constitutional 
Problem (1984).   
12 Cf. the Introduction by P.Pescatore to: M.Hilf/F.Jacobs/E.U.Petersmann (eds.), The European Community and GATT 
(London: Kluwer, 1986). 
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supported my hope that the establishment of a new GATT Office of Legal Affairs could contribute to 
limiting intergovernmental power politics by justifying GATT rules also in terms of freedoms and 
other rights of citizens, as illustrated by the GATT provisions on individual access to justice (cf. 
Article X:3 GATT) and by ‘constitutional economics’ justifying international trade in terms of 
empowering citizens to benefit from mutually beneficial economic cooperation protected by 
constitutional and non-discriminatory trade and competition rules, as in EC common market and US 
antitrust law. It seemed obvious for a constitutional lawyer that the customary law requirement of 
interpreting treaties ‘in conformity with the principles of justice and international law’ was important 
for clarifying many vaguely drafted GATT provisions through ‘due process of law’, for instance the 
GATT provisions on ‘violation complaints’, ‘non-violation complaints’ and ‘situation complaints’ 
among GATT contracting parties (cf. GATT Article XXIII) as well as on individual access to justice 
(cf. Article X:3 GATT), which reflected the ancient legal distinctions between principles of 
distributive, corrective, commutative justice and equity as discussed already in Aristotelian 
philosophy.  
Upon my arrival in March 1981, working inside the GATT Secretariat as ‘legal officer’ provoked 
many GATT colleagues to tell me that – as the GATT Secretariat had never formally established an 
Office of Legal Affairs up to 1981 - ‘GATT should never have a legal office’ so as to avoid undue 
‘legalization’ of pragmatic GATT negotiations. The proverbial ‘GATT pragmatism’ cultivated inside 
the GATT Secretariat aimed at avoiding ‘legal formalism’, for instance by allowing trade ministers 
and ambassadors to sign GATT legal instruments without providing ‘full powers’ delegated by the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs (which, at least in one instance, led to a subsequent legal challenge of such 
a Tokyo Round Agreement signature by a Latin-American Minister of Commerce). In GATT dispute 
settlement proceedings, GATT secretariat officials and trade diplomats serving as ‘panelists’ 
frequently rejected my propositions of justifying GATT interpretations and GATT dispute settlement 
findings by referring to the customary methods of treaty interpretation. Even though I carried out my 
legal analytical work (e.g. elaborating the GATT-Status of Legal Instruments and two completely new 
loose-leaf editions of the GATT Analytical Index. Notes on the Drafting, Interpretation and 
Application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT, 1985/1989, 900 pp) and legal 
administrative work (e.g. concerning the function of the GATT Director-General as depository of all 
GATT legal instruments, their notification to the UN Legal Services, the formal ‘derestriction’ of 
confidential GATT documents) under the supervision of Mr. van Tuinen, my post had been formally 
assigned to the GATT Session and Council Affairs Division directed by Mr. Stuart Robinson. One 
reason for this dual assignment was that I also had to participate in servicing GATT conferences (e.g. 
drafting the minutes of meetings of the annual Sessions of the GATT Contracting Parties and of the 
monthly meetings of the GATT Council), cooperating with other GATT Divisions, publishing 
numerous GATT documents (e.g. the annual GATT Basic Instruments and Selected Documents), and 
to contribute to missions of the Director-General (eg accompanying the DG to meetings with German 
ministers, contributing to the drafting of speeches by the DG). Yet, more important reasons for my 
assignment to GATT’s Conference Division included the only ‘virtual existence’ - without any formal 
visibility - of an Office of Legal Affairs inside the GATT Secretariat in 1981/82; the delicate nature of 
my work on a new ‘GATT Analytical Index’ referring also to inconsistencies between GATT’s 
diplomatic jurisprudence and the ‘law in the books’; the ‘anti-legal prejudices’ cultivated by many 
trade diplomats intent on avoiding ‘legal accountability’ inside and beyond the GATT Secretariat; and 
the pragmatic attitude of Mr. van Tuinen as the Director-General’s personal legal advisor towards the 
‘law in practice’ (e.g. GATT panel interpretations of GATT provisions without reference to the 
customary methods of treaty interpretation). My second boss, Stewart Robinson, advised me that – in 
my work as ‘legal officer’ – I better follow the example of an ‘U boat’ by doing my legal research 
(e.g. on the GATT Analytical Index compiling GATT legal instruments regarding the interpretation 
and application of GATT Articles) focusing on my practical work inside GATT’s Conference Division 
- with ‘low visibility’ and avoiding legal conflicts, for instance regarding legal advice given by the 
operational GATT divisions that continued to handle GATT dispute settlement proceedings, or 
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regarding the contested legality of the then widespread ‘voluntary export restraints’ and other ‘grey 
area trade restrictions’ practiced by trade diplomats to the detriment of the consumer welfare and 
democratic rights of their citizens.  
Even though Mr. van Tuinen did not formally participate in GATT dispute settlement panels serviced 
by the respective operational GATT Divisions in charge of the respective subject matters, some 
operational GATT divisions began asking my legal advice on specific legal issues (e.g. regarding 
GATT panel discussions on the difference between a ‘treaty reservation’ and a ‘declaration of 
interpretation’). In response to the criticism of a number of GATT panel findings since the late 
1970s
13
, GATT Director-General Dunkel decided in 1982 to establish a GATT Office of Legal Affairs 
on a permanent basis. Although Mr. van Tuinen was formally described as ‘Director, Office of Legal 
Affairs’ in the GATT phone directory since September 1982 until his retirement at the end of 1982, it 
was only after the appointment of Mr. A.Lindén as Director of a new Office of Legal Affairs in 1983 
that two additional lawyers - i.e. Frieder Roessler and myself – were formally assigned to the new 
Office of Legal Affairs. GATT’s phone directory continued to list the ‘Session and Council Affairs 
Division’ of S. Robinson as part of the Office of Legal Affairs until the appointment of F. Roessler as 
Director of a new Legal Affairs Division established in 1989, when the Session and Council Affairs 
Division became a formally separate Division in view of the ever increasing workload of the few 
lawyers working in the Legal Affairs Division mainly on legal GATT documents, dispute settlement 
proceedings, the Uruguay Round negotiations regarding a new ‘Dispute Settlement Understanding’, 
and the new legal-institutional framework of the WTO. After resuming my academic career in October 
1989, I accepted the requests of successive GATT Director-Generals to serve two Uruguay Round 
negotiating groups (on dispute settlement and institutions) as legal consultant and to participate in 
GATT dispute settlement practices as member or chairman of GATT/WTO dispute settlement panels 
and consultant legal advisor for less-developed countries.  
II. From ‘Conciliation’ to ‘Due Process of Law’ and ‘Third Party Adjudication’ in 
GATT Dispute Settlement Practices during the 1980s 
The drafters of the 1948 Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO) had provided 
for third-party adjudication of international trade and economic disputes through legal rulings by the 
ITO Executive Board, with the possibility of an appeal to the plenary Conference of the ITO and a 
right to seek an Advisory Opinion by the ICJ. As GATT 1947 was negotiated on the basis of a limited 
negotiating authority of the US delegation and ‘provisionally applied’ since 1 January 1948 as a 
temporary contract for reciprocal tariff liberalization until its future incorporation into the ITO 
Charter, its dispute settlement provisions (notably GATT Articles XXII, XXIII) remained vague and 
less ambitious than those of the draft ITO Charter. Following the refusal by the US Congress to ratify 
the ITO Charter and the abandonment of the ITO in 1950, the GATT CONTRACTING PARTIES – 
i.e. the plenary meeting of the initially 23 signatory governments of GATT 1947 – progressively 
exercised and developed their dispute settlement authority under GATT Article XXIII, for instance by 
approving dispute settlement rulings by the Chairman of the CONTRACTING PARTIES, by GATT 
Working Parties (including the parties to the dispute as well as other contracting parties with direct 
interests in the dispute) and, since 1952, by GATT dispute settlement panels composed of three of five 
neutral panelists (usually trade diplomats) from third countries. In these diverse dispute settlement 
procedures, the GATT Secretariat assisted trade diplomats in the drafting of their legal findings and in 
the progressive codification of GATT dispute settlement practices. From 1963 to 1970, the 
participation of the EC and of an ever larger number of less-developed GATT contracting parties 
sparked an ‘anti-legalist movement within GATT’ (Hudec) emphasizing the need for negotiations (e.g. 
                                                     
13 Cf. R.E.Hudec, The Role of the GATT Secretariat in the Evolution of the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure, in: 
J.Bhagwati/M.Hirsch (eds), The Uruguay Round and Beyond: Essays in Honour of Arthur Dunkel (Heidelberg: Springer, 
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during the Kennedy Round of multilateral trade negotiations 1964-1967) and for ‘pragmatic solutions’ 
of legal challenges of the EC’s common agricultural and preferential trade policies as well as of illegal 
trade barriers impeding developing country access to developed countries.
14
 Since 1970, the number of 
GATT dispute settlement reports steadily increased. The Tokyo Round Agreements of 1979 included 
an ‘Understanding Regarding Notification, Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance’ 
codifying and developing GATT dispute settlement practices under Articles XXII and XXIII GATT.
15
 
Yet, since the four 1976 GATT panel reports on income tax practices in Belgium, France, the 
Netherlands and the USA, the 1978 panel report on minimum import prices administered by the EEC, 
two GATT panels reports of 1979 and 1980 on EEC export subsidies for sugar, the 1980 GATT panel 
report on EEC restrictions on imports of apples, and the 1981 panel report on Spanish import 
restrictions on soya bean oil, the inadequate legal reasoning of GATT panel findings was increasingly 
criticized by governments and lawyers and risked undermining the legitimacy and effectiveness of the 
GATT dispute settlement system. 
In a GATT Ministerial Decision adopted on 29 November 1982, the GATT CONTRACTING 
PARTIES gave the GATT Secretariat formal responsibility of assisting the dispute settlement panels, 
especially on the legal, historical and procedural aspects of the matters dealt with. In order to 
demonstrate his support for the Office of Legal Affairs, Director-General Dunkel decided to locate the 
new Legal Office next to his own office inside the Centre William Rappard. Since 1983, Messrs 
Lindén, Roessler and myself progressively participated in GATT panel proceedings until the Director-
General formally decided that the servicing by the Secretariat of GATT dispute settlement panels was 
the joint responsibility of the operational division in charge of the subject-matter (usually drafting the 
factual parts of the panel report) as well as of the Office of Legal Affairs (usually drafting the legal 
findings in the panel report). Only exceptionally, if there was no operational GATT division with 
special expertise (e.g. on tax legislation), would a GATT dispute settlement panel be served 
exclusively by the Office of Legal Affairs.
16
 In the GATT ‘Basic Instruments and Selected 
Documents’, GATT dispute settlement reports continued to be published under the heading 
‘conciliation’. But the increasing influence of GATT lawyers on the legal findings prompted GATT 
dispute settlement panels to progressively apply and cite the customary methods of treaty 
interpretation (as codified in the VCLT) and other rules and principles of international law. Working 
inside GATT’s Office of Legal Affairs allowed me to take numerous initiatives, such as arranging 
official meetings with judges from the European Court of Justice and inviting retired judges to serve as 
GATT panelists. The legal arguments submitted by lawyers from the GATT Secretariat to GATT 
panelists occasionally provoked counter-pressures. For instance, when a former judge from the EC 
Court of Justice chaired a GATT dispute settlement panel and disagreed with the legal advice from the 
GATT Secretariat, he convened legal deliberations by the 3 GATT panelists without presence of 
lawyers from the GATT Secretariat and drafted himself the legal findings of the panel. But his 
insistence on presenting himself his final panel report to the GATT Council prompted GATT Director-
General Dunkel to tell me that this kind of ‘legalist lecture’ to GATT ambassadors merited no 
repeating. The increasing number of GATT panel findings against antidumping and countervailing 
duties imposed by the USA prompted the USA to block the adoption of a large number of panel 
reports under the 1979 Tokyo Round Agreements on Antidumping and Subsidies ushering in a 
decision by Director-General Dunkel – following a request from US Trade Representative Carla Hills 
pointing to the political risks of adverse panel findings for approval by the US Congress of future 
Uruguay Round Agreements - to limit the participation of lawyers from GATT’s Office of Legal 
                                                     
14
 Cf. Hudec (note 13), at 109 ff, and the chronological listing of all GATT dispute settlement proceedings under GATT 
Article XXIII in: Petersmann (note 2), at 248 ff. 
15
 Cf. The Tokyo Round Agreements (GATT 1986), at 200 ff. 
16
 An example was the panel report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages I, adopted on 10 November 1987, which was drafted 
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Affairs in the often politicized disputes over antidumping and countervailing duties administered by 
the GATT Secretariat Division specialized in antidumping, countervailing duties and subsidies.
17
 
Until the beginning of the Uruguay Round negotiations in 1987, almost all panel reports submitted to 
the GATT Council under Article XXIII:2 GATT had been adopted and, in most cases, also 
implemented. Only in respect of a few panel reports, the GATT Council either adopted the reports 
subject to an ‘understanding’ that amounted to a partial revision of the relevant legal findings18, or 
refrained from adopting the panel report. But also in the case of the four GATT panel reports not 
adopted under Article XXIII during the 38 years of GATT 1947
19
 until its termination in 1995, the 
disputing parties settled their dispute on the basis of the panel report. Thus, the ‘legal filtering’ and 
non-adoption by the GATT Council of these reports reflected an attempt at avoiding legally wrong 
interpretations (e.g. in the Soyabeans and Citrus panel findings) or at keeping open interpretative 
issues (e.g. in the Canned Fruit and Gold Coins cases) which the defendants continued to challenge; 
arguably, the dispute settlement process under GATT Article XXIII had not broken down. In his 
annual report to the GATT Council in 1989, the GATT Director-General emphasized with regard to 
the general GATT dispute settlement procedure: ‘Overall, the experience with the adoption of panel 
reports continues to be good. There has so far been no instance in which a panel report was neither 
adopted nor implemented merely because the party complained against refused to accept the panel’s 
recommendations’.20 Yet, even though the Uruguay Round negotiations remained dominated by 
diplomats interested in protecting their self-interests (such as limiting their legal accountability vis-à-
vis citizens
21
), the DSU reforms of the GATT dispute settlement system reflected widespread 
dissatisfaction with GATT’s ‘diplomats jurisprudence’. If the GATT dispute settlement system is 
evaluated from a broader ‘constitutional perspective’ as reflected in the customary rules of treaty 
interpretation, two ‘systemic failures’ remain outstanding, as summarized in the concluding Sections 
III and IV. 
III. Lack of ‘Democratic Public Reason’ in GATT/WTO ‘Diplomats Jurisprudence’? 
Need for Taking the Customary Rules of Treaty Interpretation More Seriously 
Compared with GATT 1947 and the 1979 Tokyo Round Agreements, the 1994 WTO Agreement and 
the compulsory ‘dispute settlement system of the WTO’ (Article 3 DSU) have strengthened the 
systemic character of GATT/WTO law in terms of both its ‘primary rules of conduct’ and its 
‘secondary rules of recognition, change and adjudication’.22 According to Article 3 of the DSU, the  
‘dispute settlement of the WTO is a central element in providing security and predictability to the 
multilateral trading system. The Members recognize that it serves to preserve the rights and 
obligations of Members under the covered agreements, and to clarify the existing provisions of 
those agreement in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of public international law’ 
(para.2).  
                                                     
17 Cf. E.U.Petersmann (note 2), at 90 f.  
18 Examples include the ‘DISC’ cases (BISD 28S/114 ff) and the ‘Spring Assemblies Panel Report’ (BISD 30 S/107, 
C/M/168), both of which were rightly criticized for their unconvincing legal findings.  
19 These were the Spanish Soyabeans panel report (L/5142), the EEC Canned Fruit panel report (L/5778), the EEC citrus 
preferences panel report (L/5776) and the Gold Coins panel report (L/5863).  
20 Cf. Petersmann (note 2), at 88. On the problems under the special dispute settlement procedures provided in the 1979 
Tokyo Round Agreements see: idem, at 90 f, 223 ff. 
21 As illustrated by the explicit exclusion – for instance, in the EU and US legislation implementing the WTO legal 
obligations in their domestic legal systems - of ‘direct applicability’ of WTO rules in domestic courts; cf. Petersmann 
(note 2), at 18 ff. 
22 On the characteristics of ‘legal systems’ see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: OUP, 1994), chapter V. 
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The explicit reference to the customary rules of treaty interpretation was inserted into the DSU so as to 
terminate, once and for all, the frequent neglect - by GATT diplomats, GATT panelists and GATT 
officials without legal training - for general international law as relevant legal context for interpreting 
GATT rules. Yet, WTO dispute settlement bodies continue neglecting that the customary rules of 
treaty interpretation and adjudication require interpreting treaties and settling related disputes not only 
on the basis of the text, context, objective and purpose of the applicable rules; as explicitly recalled in 
the Preamble and Article 31 VCLT, treaty interpretation and adjudication must also remain ‘in 
conformity with the principles of justice and international law’, including ‘human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all’ (cf. Preamble and Article 31 VCLT), as confirmed in numerous UN 
legal instruments. As Article 23 DSU on the ‘Strengthening of the Multilateral System’ requires all 
WTO Members to settle disputes ‘consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate 
Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding’, impartial 
and independent adjudication has become of constitutional importance for rule-clarification and 
dispute settlement under WTO law, especially in times of global economic and poverty crises and 
political disagreement on consensus-based rule-making and ‘authoritative interpretations’ by the 
political WTO bodies. As citizens and governments with often conflicting worldviews are unlikely to 
ever agree on any comprehensive theory of justice, they must focus on ‘an overlapping consensus’ 
(J.Rawls) limited to ‘principles of justice’ that must be consistent with ‘human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all’, as recalled in the VCLT. By clarifyoing from impartial and independent perspectives 
how international treaties ratified by parliaments for the benefit of citizens have to be construed ‘in 
conformity with principles of justice’ and the universal human rights obligations of UN member 
states, courts of justice must justify their legal findings in terms of ‘principles of justice’ that can be 
supported and shared as legitimate ‘opinio juris’ by governments and citizens without prejudice to 
their often diverse worldviews. As recalled by the ICJ and numerous other international courts: 
‘Whatever the legal reasoning of a court of justice, its decisions must by definition be just, and 
therefore in that sense equitable.’23‘Equity as a legal concept is a direct emanation of the idea of 
justice. The Court whose task is by definition to administer justice is bound to apply it.’24 
One unique feature of the ‘dispute settlement system of the WTO’ is that the discussion and, so far, 
approval of all panel and Appellate Body reports by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) enables all 
WTO governments to voice any disagreements with dispute settlement interpretations in order to 
inform and guide future WTO jurisprudence. Yet, the exclusive composition of the DSB by diplomats 
– without any ‘voice’ for the often millions of producers, traders, investors, consumers, companies, 
civil society institutions and parliaments affected by WTO dispute settlement rulings – also limits the 
democratic legitimacy and ‘public reason’ of DSB decisions on WTO dispute settlement reports.  
How to Justify GATT/WTO Rules vis-à-vis Citizens as ‘Agents of Justice’?  
Justice is essentially about the human right of citizens to justification of law and governance vis-à-vis 
citizens with due respect for their human rights.
25
 As subjects of inalienable human rights, citizens are 
‘democratic principals’ and ‘agents of justice’ of modern international law and can assess the demands 
of justice only through ‘deliberative’ and ‘participatory democracy’ institutionalizing their ‘public 
reason’. The systemic exclusion of citizens and national parliaments from intergovernmental 
rulemaking in the WTO entails ‘discourse failures’ (such as the systemic omission of human rights 
and consumer welfare from WTO rules and WTO discourse) that undermine the legitimacy of WTO 
governance and its contribution to protecting human rights. Some UN treaty ‘constitutions’ (sic) – for 
instance, the constitutions (sic) establishing the International Labor Organization (ILO), the World 
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Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the UN Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) – explicitly justify their functionally limited treaty 
regimes for the protection of international public goods demanded by citizens in terms of protection of 
labor rights and social justice (through ILO law), the human right to health (through WHO law), 
freedom from hunger (through FAO law) and human rights to education, democratic self-government 
and rule of law (through UNESCO conventions). UN human rights law acknowledges and justifies 
ever more ‘inalienable’ human rights by respect for the reasonableness, dignity, morality 
(‘conscience’), human autonomy and basic needs of individuals who are recognized as being entitled 
not only to individual and democratic self-determination, but also to ‘a social and international order 
in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized’ (Article 28 of the 
1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights = UDHR). Yet, the more globalization transforms 
national public goods into transnational ‘aggregate public goods’ (like a rules based trading system), 
the more national (big C) Constitutions turn out to be ‘partial constitutions’ that can no longer protect 
many public goods without international law and institutions. As UN member states have increasingly 
confirmed human rights to ‘sustainable development’ and the need for collective supply of 
international public goods through international law and multilevel governance institutions
26
, human 
rights law requires interpreting international law – including WTO treaty objectives like ‘sustainable 
development’ (WTO Preamble) and ‘providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading 
system’ (Article 3 DSU) - from democratic perspectives enabling citizens to understand themselves as 
co-authors of international law, democratic owners (‘principals’) of all governance institutions (as 
‘agents’ with constitutionally limited powers), and as ‘agents of justice’ and main legal subjects of 
legal systems. This is particularly true for IEL regulating mutually beneficial trade transactions among 
citizens. The explicit commitments of WTO law to the customary law requirements of interpreting and 
clarifying the often indeterminate WTO rules (e.g. on ‘national treatment’, ‘non-violation complaints’) 
‘in conformity with principles of justice’ and ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms for all’ justify 
legal presumptions that national parliaments have ratified the WTO guarantees of economic freedoms, 
non-discriminatory conditions of competition, rule of law and governmental protection of non-
economic public interests (like ‘public order’, human health) so as to protect corresponding interests 
and rights of citizens rather than only rights and duties of governments. Just as national and 
international courts construe European economic law, international investment law, intellectual 
property law and human rights law as justifying cosmopolitan rights of citizens (e.g. investor rights 
derived from international investment treaties, human rights recognized by UN human rights 
conventions), the citizen-oriented functions of trade law justify ‘inclusive, constitutional 
interpretations’ for the benefit of citizens as main economic actors and legal subjects of democratic 
legal systems.
27
 
How to Interpret GATT/WTO Rules for the Benefit of Citizens? 
Utilitarian trade and power politics aimed at maximizing ‘Kaldor-Hicks efficiency’ (i.e. regardless of 
the distribution of the gains from trade) risks being inconsistent with the human rights obligations of 
governance institutions to respect, protect and fulfill the fundamental rights of every individual. 
Ronald Dworkin’s distinction of the following ‘four stages of legal theory’ illustrates how much 
doctrinal concepts of the GATT/WTO legal and dispute settlement system depend on judicial 
clarification of ‘principles of justice’: 
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 at the ‘semantic stage’, legal terms (like justice, human rights, liberty, non-discrimination, ‘trade 
under fully competitive conditions’, rule of law, a ‘fair comparison’ of the export price with ‘the 
normal value’ of imported goods ) tend to be ‘interpretive concepts’ which people share even if 
they disagree about the criteria for identifying injustice and for applying such ‘interpretive 
concepts’; hence, a ‘useful theory of an interpretive concept must itself be an interpretation, 
which is very likely to be controversial, of the practice in which the concept figures’28, with due 
regard to the legitimate interests of all affected persons; 
 at the ‘jurisprudential stage’, the legal interpreter must search for the values that supply the best 
interpretation of the aspirational values of legal concepts like rule of law, including the ‘ideal of 
political integrity’ as a requirement of governing ‘through a coherent set of political principles 
whose benefits extend to all citizens’ and legitimize coercive power of states;29 
 at the ‘doctrinal stage’, the ‘truth conditions of propositions of law’ must be constructed ‘in the 
light of the values identified at the jurisprudential stage’ so that legal justifications fit the 
practice as well as the values that the practice serves (e.g. the constitutional and procedural 
practices in which legal claims are embedded);
30
  
 at the ‘adjudicative stage’, courts of justice deploying the monopoly of coercive power must 
impartially and independently review whether the enforcement of the law in particular cases by 
political officials is legally justified by ‘the best interpretation of legal practice overall’;31 
according to Dworkin’s ‘adjudicative principle of integrity’, judges should interpret law - in 
conformity with its objectives of legality, rule-of-law and its underlying constitutional principles 
of justice - as expressing ‘a coherent conception of justice and fairness’: ‘Law as integrity asks 
judges to assume, so far as this is possible, that the law is structured by a coherent set of 
principles about justice and fairness and procedural due process, and it asks them to enforce 
these in the fresh cases that come before them, so that each person’s situation is fair and just 
according to the same standards.’32 
The customary rules of treaty interpretation confirm that ‘principles of justice’ and ‘human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all’ – rather than foreign policy discretion to tax and restrict domestic 
citizens in welfare-reducing ways (e.g. through tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers) and to engage in 
allegedly ‘efficient breaches’ of international treaties ratified by parliaments for the benefit of citizens 
– are the relevant principles for interpreting and justifying GATT/WTO rules. Similar to Dworkin’s 
distinction between ‘four stages of legal theory’, John Rawls explains why independent and impartial 
courts can operate as ‘exemplars of public reason’ defending human rights and other constitutional 
‘principles of justice’ against majority politics and related abuses of public and private power.33 Law – 
in contrast to natural sciences - is not about discovering ‘objective truth out there’; it is rather about 
‘institutionalizing public reason’ through constitutional, legislative, administrative, judicial 
rulemaking, participatory rule-clarification (eg through judicial remedies of individuals) and 
‘deliberative democracy’ in response to civil society challenges of the ubiquity of abuses of public and 
private powers. Diplomatic monopolization of intergovernmental rulemaking (eg in secretive 
GATT/WTO negotiations) without effective parliamentary and democratic control risks undermining 
general consumer welfare and human rights, which diplomats deliberately refrained from mentioning 
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anywhere explicitly in GATT/WTO law. The ‘public choice hypothesis’ – i.e. that all power risks 
being abused by the rational self-interests of the rulers – is confirmed by the empirical fact that IEL 
systems with stronger multilevel ‘constitutional checks and balances’ - like European economic law 
and international investment law - tend to be construed by national and international courts as 
protecting also rights of citizens even if the international rules were addressed to states without 
explicitly providing for cosmopolitan rights: 
‘the fact that certain provisions of the Treaty are formally addressed to the Member States does not 
prevent rights from being conferred at the same time on any individual who has an interest in 
compliance with the obligations thus laid down (see Case 43/75 Defrenne v Sabena [1976] ECR 
455, par. 31). Such consideration must, a fortiori, be applicable to Article 48 of the Treaty, 
which … is designed to ensure that there is no discrimination on the labour market’.34 
The institutionalized independence and more impartial reasoning of the WTO Appellate Body have 
weakened the dependence of many ad hoc WTO panels on the diplomatic reasoning of non-lawyers 
serving as WTO panelists as well as on the assistance from operational WTO Secretariat divisions 
involved in WTO negotiations (and tempted to use their drafting of WTO panel reports for advancing 
political negotiation positions favored by them). For instance, in the almost 20 WTO dispute 
settlement proceedings challenging the protectionist ‘zeroing practices’ of EC and US antidumping 
authorities in their calculations of antidumping duties, the WTO Appellate Body has rightly 
interpreted the WTO requirement of ‘fair price comparisons’ from the perspective of the reasonable 
interests of economic actors rather than – as advocated by the WTO panels in conformity with the 
advice given to them by the WTO’s ‘Rules Division’ (dealing with antidumping, countervailing duty 
and subsidy practices) – from the perspective of EC and US antidumping bureaucracies claiming that 
they had not intended to limit their ‘sovereign right to apply zeroing methodologies’ by concluding the 
WTO Agreement on Antidumping.
35
 Yet, most WTO dispute settlement reports fail to balance private 
and public interests in terms of ‘principles of justice’ and ‘human rights and fundamental freedoms for 
all’, contrary to the customary methods of treaty interpretation. 
The ‘Diplomatic Capture’ of UN and WTO Institutions Serves the Self-Interests of the Rulers 
Professor Hudec’s analysis of ‘The GATT Legal System: A Diplomat’s Jurisprudence’36 explained the 
GATT dispute settlement practices as primarily the work of diplomats and of GATT Secretariat 
officials rather than of lawyers. ‘Public choice’ theory explains why such ‘public choices’ (e.g. of not 
establishing a GATT Office of Legal Affairs from 1948 up to 1983) in ‘political markets’ tend to be 
no less influenced by individual self-interests of rational actors than ‘private choices’ in economic 
markets.
37
 Most UN and GATT/WTO diplomats favor 'Westphalian conceptions' of international law 
and worldwide institutions based on power-oriented, intergovernmental claims  
 to limit international law to rights and obligations of states without regard to the legitimacy of 
governments in the many non-democratic UN member states and to whether national ‘gains 
from trade’ are used for protecting human rights and popular self-determination or the self-
interests of the rulers; 
 to focus on ‘national interests’ as defined by national interest groups rather than on protection of 
human rights and general consumer welfare that are not mentioned in most worldwide economic 
and environmental agreements; 
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 to separate national and international legal systems and exclude legal, judicial and democratic 
remedies of citizens against welfare-reducing violations of international treaty obligations; and  
 to treat citizens as mere objects of international law – rather than as democratic ‘principals’ of all 
governance institutions – so as to avoid legal and democratic challenges of welfare-reducing, 
intergovernmental power politics and undersupply of international public goods resulting in 
unnecessary poverty of more than 1 billion people living on 1$ or less per day. 
During the 1980s, trade diplomats engaged in hundreds of bilateral export restraint agreements and 
other ‘grey area trade restrictions’ redistributing domestic income from consumers to rent-seeking 
industries in exchange for political support – often without parliamentary authorization, democratic 
accountability and judicial control.
38
 As trade policy-making in GATT was driven by power politics 
and alleged ‘state interests’ (e.g. to restrict imports of cotton and textiles from less-developed 
countries), also GATT Secretariat officials participating in GATT dispute settlement proceedings often 
responded to the political pressures ‘pragmatically’ in order to reconcile GATT rules and dispute 
settlement practices with the ‘political realities’ in multilevel governance of international trade. The 
political opposition to the establishment of a GATT Office of Legal Affairs prior to 1982 came mainly 
from EC trade diplomats concerned about legal challenges of their discriminatory trade restrictions 
favoring import competing producers (e.g. of agricultural and textiles products inside the EC) and 
preferential trade with former European colonies. Trade diplomats tend to be agnostic of ‘legal 
systems’, and are inclined to interpret the ‘object and purpose’ of trade rules for the benefit of the 
rulers (e.g. in terms of ‘Kaldor-Hicks efficiency’ rather than consumer welfare) and of their foreign 
policy discretion to negotiate ‘political bargains’ redistributing the ‘gains from trade’ and 
circumventing the rules ratified by national parliaments for the benefit of citizens. The ‘anti-legalism’ 
cultivated in GATT diplomacy was designed to avoid legal, democratic and judicial accountability of 
diplomats for the welfare-reducing effects of their trade protectionism in collaboration with rent-
seeking industries. My publications emphasized since the 1980s that – from the different point of view 
of reasonable citizens benefitting from a mutually beneficial division of labor based on transnational 
rule of law – GATT legal guarantees of economic freedom, non-discrimination, rule of law and 
sovereign rights to protect non-economic public goods (e.g. pursuant to Article XX GATT) could 
serve ‘constitutional functions’ for protecting human rights, economic freedoms, non-discriminatory 
conditions of competition and transnational rule of law for the benefit of citizens and economic actors 
participating in the global division of labor; as such ‘constitutional interpretations’ were – rightly – 
perceived as a political threat by trade diplomats requesting national and European courts to refrain 
from reviewing their persistent violations of GATT law to the detriment of consumer welfare, rule-of-
law, democracy and equal rights of citizens
39
, I remain grateful to GATT Director-General Dunkel for 
having rejected requests from GATT diplomats to exclude from the GATT Secretariat officials daring 
to criticize – in private, academic publications subject to ‘disclaimers’ - the economic inefficiency and 
illegality of certain antidumping and other ‘grey area trade practices’.   
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IV. Diplomatic Failures to Protect the ‘Multilateral Trading System’ and ‘Dispute 
Settlement System of the WTO’ as Cosmopolitan Legal Systems 
Constitutional democracies and European law protect mutually beneficial trade and economic 
cooperation among citizens inside domestic jurisdictions as ‘cosmopolitan legal orders’ with 
constitutional and judicial guarantees not only of civil and political, but also of economic and social 
rights of citizens (eg as protected under domestic constitutional, competition and social laws).
40
 Also 
international investment, intellectual property and human rights conventions among states, and some 
free trade agreements, are construed by national and international courts as protecting not only rights 
of governments, but also of their citizens. Hence, during my more than 30 years work in GATT and 
the WTO, I consistently argued for interpreting precise and unconditional GATT/WTO guarantees of 
economic freedoms, non-discrimination, rule of law and ‘access to justice’ as protecting also 
individual rights,
41
 to the dismay of trade diplomats considering ‘justice’, ‘human rights’ and 
‘constitutional discourse’ as potential threats to their ‘pragmatic management’ of trade politics. 
Access to Justice in GATT/WTO Law? 
The more globalization transforms national public goods demanded by citizens into international 
‘aggregate public goods’ that national Constitutions can protect only together with international law 
and multilevel governance institutions, the more important become multilevel guarantees of ‘access to 
justice’ extending legal and judicial remedies beyond civil and political rights of citizens. For instance:   
 Some national Constitutions have responded to systemic governance failures by providing for 
broad legal and judicial remedies whenever ‘rights are violated by public authority’ (Article 19:4 
German Basic Law). 
 Some regional economic agreements (like the Lisbon Treaty) are explicitly committed to 
facilitating ‘access to justice’ (Article 67:4 TFEU), ‘rule of law’ (Article 2 TEU) and a ‘right to 
an effective remedy and to a fair trial’ whenever ‘rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of 
the Union are violated’ (Article 47 EU Charter of Fundamental Rights). 
 The GATT and the WTO Agreements include a large number of requirements to make available 
judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals and independent review procedures not only at 
international governance levels among WTO members, but also in domestic legal systems in the 
field of GATT (cf Article X), the WTO Antidumping Agreement (cf Article 13), the WTO 
Agreement on Customs Valuation (cf Article 11), the Agreement on Pre-shipment Inspection (cf. 
Article 4), the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (cf Article 23), the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (cf Article VI GATS), the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property Rights (cf Articles 41-50, 59 TRIPS) and the Agreement on Government 
Procurement (cf Article XX). 
 In international investment law, the legal guarantees of access to justice at national and 
international levels (eg in the ICJ) have become supplemented by more than 2’800 bilateral and 
regional treaty guarantees of individual access to transnational arbitration. 
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 Some environmental conventions – like the 1998 Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters - 
protect individual ‘access to a review procedure before a court of law or another independent and 
impartial body established by law’ (Article 9) in transnational environmental regulation. 
 UN and regional human rights covenants (eg Article 34 ECHR, the Optional Protocol to the UN 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) increasingly extend protection of individual 
access to legal and (quasi)judicial remedies in case of violation of economic and social rights 
beyond national courts subject to prior exhaustion of local remedies.  
The terms ‘effective remedy’ and ‘access to justice’ are often used interchangeably for protecting 
 individual rights to effective access to a dispute resolution body; 
 rights to fair proceedings; 
 rights to timely resolution of disputes; 
 rights to adequate redress; and 
 the principle of efficiency and effectiveness of legal remedies.
42
 
In view of the global economic, environmental and poverty crises and the failures of many UN 
member states to respect, protect and fulfill their human rights obligations inside and beyond national 
jurisdictions, citizens and courts of justice increasingly insist on ‘constitutional’ and ‘human rights 
approaches’ to transnational economic regulation, for instance by claiming that - similar to multilevel 
human rights law, international criminal law, European economic integration law, international 
investment and commercial law and arbitration - also international trade law should be interpreted, 
developed and protected by national and international courts as a rights-based, participatory system of 
multilevel governance protecting individual access to justice and rule of law more effectively by 
holding governments accountable for their welfare-reducing violations of IEL to the detriment of rule-
of-law and non-discriminatory, mutually beneficial cooperation among citizens across national 
frontiers. Just as multilevel economic regulation inside the EU protects market freedoms and social 
rights as fundamental rights, the human right to ‘a social and international order in which the rights 
and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized’ (Article 28 UDHR) calls for linking 
IEL to the human rights obligations of all governments, as already proposed by US President 
Roosevelt in his ‘Four Freedoms’ speech of 1941 explaining the need for ‘a world founded upon four 
essential human freedoms’ (ie of speech, belief, freedom from fear and from want). Globalization 
confirms that human rights – notwithstanding their protection also of diverse individual as well as 
collective identities (such as national, religious, class, racial, gender identities and communities with 
diverse civilizations) – remain the common ‘foundation of freedom, peace and justice in the world’ 
(Preamble UDHR) and universally recognized ‘conditions under which justice and respect for the 
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained’ (Preamble 
UN Charter).  
The Lack of ‘Cosmopolitan Public Reason’ Undermines the Legitimacy, Effectiveness and 
Decentralized Coordination of the Rules-Based World Trading System 
The fact that WTO governance institutions do not protect justice vis-à-vis individuals, and that WTO 
diplomats - also in constitutional democracies like the EU and the USA - continue to request domestic 
courts to refrain from reviewing compliance by governments with their WTO obligations in order to 
allow diplomats ‘freedom of maneuver’ without legal accountability43, undermines not only the 
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democratic legitimacy of WTO law. It also weakens the coherence of the multilevel trading system 
with its decentralized implementation and enforcement by private economic actors, national 
legislators, governments, regulatory agencies and courts of justice in the 159 WTO members. A 
multilevel legal and trading system depends on a shared system of reasoning promoting decentralized 
coordination, transnational rule of law and an ‘overlapping consensus’ on ‘principles of justice’ 
supported by citizens, governments and non-governmental economic actors in spite of their often 
diverse self-interests and democratic preferences for diverse national Constitutions.
44
 Like citizens in a 
pluralistic, democratic society, also economic actors participating in the global division of labor share 
practical and moral coordination problems requiring reciprocal commitments to constituting, limiting, 
regulating and justifying multilevel governance institutions for the benefit of citizens, their human 
rights and rational self-interests in mutually beneficial economic and social cooperation.
45
 As the 
global division of labor is driven by demand and supply among private producers, investors, traders 
and consumers benefitting from rules-based cooperation and interested in the decentralized 
enforcement of just rules, transnational IEL requires justification by cosmopolitan rights, rule of law, 
democratic empowerment and self-governance among free and equal citizens no less than economic 
law inside constitutional democracies. Multilevel legal and judicial guarantees of transnational rule of 
law for the benefit of citizens can resolve the ‘mutual assurance problem’ that rational and reasonable 
actors will support ‘rule of law’ only if it is based on fair terms for social cooperation giving the 
assurance that others will likewise do so. By offering ‘public reasons’ for resolving conflicts over 
rights and questions of justice on the basis of rule of law, public adjudication assures citizens of the 
fairness of law and of rules-based social cooperation: ‘Public reasons are the building blocks of an 
autonomous public political morality’ and for ‘a shared logic of cooperation that is independent of 
each one’s personal conception of the good’.46 Just as theories of justice emphasize that ‘principles of 
justice’ must be mutually agreed by citizens (as agents of justice) behind a ‘veil of uncertainty’ 
(J.Rawls) promoting impartiality and reasonableness vis-à-vis all citizens (similar to impartial judicial 
administration of justice), economists (like A. Sen) and political philosophers (like M.Nussbaum) 
likewise emphasize that - ‘if the demands of justice can be assessed only with the help of public 
reasoning, and if public reasoning is constitutively related to the idea of democracy - there is an 
intimate connection between justice and democracy’47; legitimate trade and economic policies must 
(Contd.)                                                                  
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focus on promotion of ‘human capacities’ and reduction of injustices48 rather than on trade policy 
discretion to distribute ‘protection rents’ to rent-seeking interest groups in exchange for political 
support. 
The ‘Dispute Settlement System of the WTO’ Requires Multilevel Judicial Protection of 
Transnational Rule of Law for the Benefit of Citizens 
Independent and impartial, national as well as international courts of justice have legitimate 
constitutional reasons for using their constitutional powers for ‘administrating justice’ by protecting 
cosmopolitan rights of citizens and transnational rule of law in mutually beneficial trade transactions 
among citizens across national frontiers. As WTO law protects ‘access to justice’ at national levels 
(e.g. in domestic courts seized by citizens in order to review illegal trade restrictions), at transnational 
levels (e.g. in commercial arbitration in the WTO at the request of exporters challenging trade 
restrictions imposed by preshipment inspection companies pursuant to the WTO Agreement on 
Preshipment Inspection) and international levels, the ‘consistent interpretation’ and ‘judicial comity’ 
requirements underlying national and international legal systems (cf. Article 31 VCLT) require 
multilevel trade adjudication bodies to cooperate in their common task of ‘providing security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading system’ (Article 3 DSU). If the purpose of democratically 
legitimate law is to ‘institutionalize public reason’ through constitutional, legislative, administrative, 
judicial and international rulemaking and adjudication for the benefit of citizens, then the GATT legal 
and dispute settlement system should be interpreted not only as protecting rights and obligations of 
governments, but also human rights, transnational rule of law, constitutional and legislative rights of 
citizens and ‘principles of justice’, as explicitly recognized in national and international legal 
systems.
49
 Even though the GATT/WTO provisions on access to justice at national, transnational and 
international levels of dispute settlement do not provide for uniform standards of judicial review, the 
explicit legal commitment to ‘the dispute settlement system of the WTO (as) a central element in 
providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system’ (Article 3 DSU) justifies 
interpreting the multilevel GATT/WTO legal and dispute settlement provisions in mutually coherent 
ways for the benefit of citizens in order to reduce transaction costs and legal insecurity of private 
economic actors. Just as inside constitutional democracies (e.g. in US antitrust law) and regional 
economic integration law (e.g. of the EU and EEA) individual plaintiffs invoking and enforcing 
competition and trade rules in domestic courts have been likened to ‘attorney generals’ pursuing 
individual as well as ‘community interests’50, the customary law requirement of interpreting WTO 
rules ‘in conformity with the principles of justice and international law’ require impartial courts of 
justice to promote ‘consistent interpretations’ of multilevel trade regulation protecting also 
cosmopolitan rights of traders, producers, investors and consumers participating in the mutually 
                                                     
48
 On the necessary limitation of economic ‘gross domestic product’ approaches by human rights approaches and 
complementary ‘capabilities’ and ‘human development approaches’ to international economic regulation see: 
M.C.Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities. The Human Development Approach (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2011). The liberal egalitarian theory of justice of John Rawls supports only weak international duties of assistance in 
view of the primarily domestic causes of poverty inside states. By contrast, human rights law and cosmopolitan theories 
of justice recognize more comprehensive extraterritorial obligations aimed at respecting, protecting and fulfilling human 
rights - and limiting majoritarian domination and ‘harmful externalities’ of the existing ‘basic structures’ of international 
relations - also in transnational cooperation among citizens and in foreign jurisdictions. A.Sen (note 47) rightly 
emphasizes that a ‘theory of justice that can serve as the basis of practical reasoning must include ways of judging how to 
reduce injustice and advance justice, rather than aiming only at the characterization of perfectly just societies’ (p. ix).      
49 On the multilevel GATT legal and dispute settlement system see Petersmann (note 2), at 233 ff; on the ‘constitutional 
functions’ of certain IMF and GATT economic rules see Petersmann (note 8), at 210 ff.  
50
 This conception was emphasized by the CJEU in its Van Gend en Loos judgment (Case 26/62, ECR 1963, 1), where the 
CJEU stated that ‘the vigilance of the individuals concerned to protect their rights amounts to an effective supervision in 
addition to the supervision entrusted by (ex) Articles 169 and 170 to the diligence of the Commission and the Member 
States’.  
The Establishment of a GATT Office of Legal Affairs and the Limits of ‘Public Reason’ 
19 
beneficial, global division of labor.
51
 The ‘consistent interpretation’ and ‘judicial comity’ principles 
offer sufficiently flexible methods of respecting legitimate ‘constitutional pluralism’ and the diverse 
conceptions of international economic law, for instance perceiving  
 WTO law as a part of public international law regulating the international economy on the 
basis of ‘sovereign equality of states’; 
 WTO law as global administrative law aimed at limiting also abuses of power through 
multilevel administrative law principles underlying the law of international organizations and of 
constitutional democracies, such as principles of transparency, legal accountability, limited 
delegation of powers, due process of law and judicial remedies; or 
 WTO law as multilevel economic regulation prescribing the use of efficient trade policy 
instruments (e.g. non-discriminatory regulation, tariffs and subsidies rather than discriminatory 
non-tariff trade barriers) with due respect for ‘constitutional pluralism’ inside national 
jurisdictions.
52
 
Reasonableness vs. Rationality: Cosmopolitan Conceptions of International Law Require 
‘Struggles for Justice’ also in International Trade Law 
As first explained by Kantian legal theory, state-centered ‘multilevel constitutionalism’ cannot 
effectively protect human rights and other international public goods (like a rules-based world trading 
system) without additional multilevel constitutional safeguards of cosmopolitan rights 
institutionalizing ‘public reason’ and limiting the rational pursuit of self-interests in all human 
interactions at national, transnational and international levels.
53
 The historical evolution of rights-
based, transnational commercial law, human rights law, constitutional democracies, regional economic 
integration law and international investment law confirms the insight of the German jurist R.Jhering 
who noted, almost a century ago, that the 'life of the law’ often depends on citizens struggling for their 
rights; such ‘struggle for his rights’ may be a ‘duty of the person whose rights have been violated' as 
well as a 'duty to society'.
54
 Trade policies - like many other policy areas – remain subject to constant 
conflicts of interests and struggles for power, for instance between consumers benefiting from liberal 
trade and import-competing producers benefiting from trade protection. In 1983, the former GATT 
Director-General O.Long invited Mr. Lindén and myself to a series of ‘working lunches’ in order to 
review the legal dimensions of his draft lecture at the Hague Academy of International Law on La 
Place du Droit et Ses Limites dans le Système Commercial Multilatéral du GATT.
55
 Mr. Long 
emphasized the limits of law in GATT negotiations and diplomacy and concluded:  
‘Au stade actuel, le droit du GATT, comme, d’une façon générale, le droit économique 
international, est profondément marqué de pragmatisme. Il doit s’adapter, dans ses règles de fond 
comme dans ses procédures, aux réalités de la politique commerciale. Il semble se prêter mal à des 
considérations de nature doctrinale. Nous nous sommes efforcé de le décrire tel qu’il est, sans 
enjolivures.’
56
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This contribution has emphasized, by contrast, the normative task of law in the 21st century to 
institutionalize ‘cosmopolitan public reason’ in order to constitute, limit, regulate and justify more 
legitimate multilevel trade governance for the benefit of citizens in conformity with the customary law 
requirements of protecting ‘principles of justice’ and human rights in the interpretation of international 
law and in the adjudication of related disputes. The two ‘systemic failures’ of the GATT/WTO dispute 
settlement system identified in Sections III and IV – i.e. its inadequate institutionalization of 
‘democratic public reason’ holding WTO governance institutions more accountable for their failure to 
protect international public goods more effectively (Section III), and the unreasonable interpretation of 
the multilevel ‘dispute settlement system of the WTO’ in terms of rights of governments without 
cosmopolitan rights and effective ‘access to justice’ of private and corporate economic actors (Section 
IV) – are due to ‘diplomatic interpretations’ of WTO rules. As long as WTO institutions remain 
dominated by trade diplomats avoiding human rights discourse and using their foreign policy 
discretion in order to limit their legal, judicial and democratic accountability vis-à-vis citizens, 
promotion of ‘cosmopolitan justice’ depends on struggles by citizens for their cosmopolitan rights and 
on their judicial protection by national and international courts of justice (eg through judicial comity 
among national and international trade courts pursuant to the ‘consistent interpretation’ requirements 
of national and international legal systems, by protecting more inclusive and more transparent WTO 
dispute settlement proceedings through allowing amicus curiae interventions by non-governmental 
civil society institutions). In order to promote more effective democratic control of the ‘dispute 
settlement system of the WTO’, the review by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body of all WTO panel, 
appellate and arbitral reports needs to be supplemented by additional public reviews by the legal 
profession in order to enable civil society to evaluate WTO jurisprudence more independently.
57
  
Justifying WTO Law in Terms of Cosmopolitan Justice Could Enable ‘Piecemeal Reforms’ also 
through Domestic Courts as ‘Community Courts’ 
International institutions have to respect their limited jurisdictions and the ‘reasonable disagreements’ 
among peoples on how international human rights and other ‘principles of justice’ should be 
implemented in IEL and inside national jurisdictions.
58
 There is no evidence so far that the more than 
100 WTO Appellate Body reports have violated human rights of citizens. Yet, the disregard for WTO 
law and WTO dispute settlement rulings in most national and regional jurisdictions unnecessarily 
weakens respect for transnational rule of law to the detriment of economic actors relying on 
compliance with WTO law and the related reduction of transaction costs. Just as domestic courts in 
European economic law and international commercial, investment and human rights law acts as 
‘community courts’ protecting fundamental rights of citizens, the multilevel ‘dispute settlement 
system of the WTO’ should be protected through multilevel judicial cooperation for the benefit of 
citizens. A ‘constitutional approach’ could promote legal ‘balancing’ of public and private interests in 
GATT/WTO jurisprudence, ‘consistent interpretations’ of multilevel trade regulation, ‘judicial 
comity’ among national and international trade jurisdictions and the legitimacy of WTO jurisprudence 
by justifying interpretations of WTO rules with due respect for the diverse constitutional and human 
rights of citizens and peoples. Yet, in view of the GATT/WTO provisions reserving sovereign rights 
(eg in GATT Article XX) to restrict international trade in order to protect non-economic public goods 
and the legitimate diversity of national constitutional systems (eg regulating the ‘domestic law effects’ 
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of international law), ‘constitutional interpretations’ of WTO rules in multilevel trade adjudication 
would not radically change the interpretation of rights and obligations among WTO members. The 
unique WTO legal system of discussing and approving WTO dispute settlement reports in the 
intergovernmental WTO Dispute Settlement Body, the power of WTO members to adopt authoritative 
interpretations of WTO law, and the sovereign rights of WTO members to decide on their own 
methods of implementing WTO obligations in their domestic legal systems would ensure that 
governments would continue to control ‘constitutional reasoning’ and the legitimate ‘constitutional 
pluralism’ governing domestic polities. Even if WTO members remain unlikely to ever agree on any 
comprehensive theory of justice, justifying WTO rules in terms of principles of distributive, 
corrective, commutative justice and equity could also help clarifying the legitimate scope of violation 
complaints, non-violation complaints and ‘situation complaints’ in GATT/WTO law and strengthen 
transnational rule of law for the benefit of citizens. 
After 12 years of Doha Round negotiations on trade liberalization and regulation inside the WTO, 
governments and economic actors increasingly emphasize the advantages of negotiating regional and 
plurilateral trade agreements outside the WTO. A ‘constitutional approach’ argues for interpreting 
such multilevel trade regulation and trade adjudication as integral parts of the ‘multilateral trading 
system’ as defined in WTO law (e.g. Article XXIV GATT). Rather than alienating citizens and 
national parliaments by excluding them from WTO governance, non-governmental economic actors 
and ‘WTO citizens’ should be recognized as legal subjects of WTO law entitled to rely on multilevel 
legal protection of WTO law in multilevel trade governance. The WTO objective of ‘sustainable 
development’ – if construed in conformity with the UN resolutions on ‘sustainable development’ as a 
human right of individuals and of people – could support the argument of this contribution that the 
customary law requirements of treaty interpretation justify cosmopolitan interpretations of the WTO 
legal and dispute settlement system offering citizens incentives for decentralized support and 
enforcement of WTO rules through domestic courts of justice. The ‘rational choice model’ underlying 
the WTO’s one-sided focus on power-oriented utility maximization must be replaced by the 
‘reasonable choice models’ of constitutional theories of justice, impartial adjudication and rule-of-law 
balancing individual pursuit of interests with the reasonable interests of all other citizens. The same 
‘principles of justice’ that citizens support inside constitutional democracies as necessary 
constitutional restraints on rational egoism (such as human rights, rule of law, democratic self-
governance) must guide the necessary cosmopolitan reforms of international law and institutions for 
the collective supply of international public goods demanded by citizens. Contrary to the statement by 
former GATT Director-General O. Long 30 years ago59, the time has come for justifying WTO law 
and adjudication by ‘principles of justice’ that citizens, parliaments and governments can share in spite 
of their legitimately diverse conceptions of social justice. 
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